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To identify sources of transmission for area clusters, in 
2007 the Houston Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices conducted an 8-month study of enhanced surveillance 
of Salmonella infection. Protocol included patient interviews 
and linking the results of interviews to clusters of pulsed-
ﬁ   eld gel electrophoresis patterns detected by the local 
PulseNet laboratory. 
T
o detect Salmonella clusters, public health laboratories 
perform pulsed-ﬁ  eld gel electrophoresis (PFGE) that 
provides a PFGE pattern, or DNA ﬁ  ngerprint. If the PFGE 
patterns of isolates from >2 persons are indistinguishable, 
the responsible bacteria may be related to a common source 
(1–3). PulseNet is a network of public health laboratories 
coordinated by the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC), in which bacteria that cause foodborne dis-
eases, including Salmonella isolates, are analyzed by using 
PFGE. This network  provides the means to rapidly com-
pare PFGE patterns from isolates submitted in different 
geographic areas. State and local laboratories upload PFGE 
patterns to the national CDC PulseNet database. Indistin-
guishable patterns at the national level might represent a 
large multistate outbreak (4–6).
As a city health department located in the state of Tex-
as, the Houston Department of Health and Human Services 
(HDHHS) investigates all local Salmonella cases to detect 
outbreaks and vehicles of transmission. The HDHHS lab-
oratory has been certiﬁ  ed as a PulseNet laboratory since 
2001 and serves residents of Houston (≈2.1 million per-
sons) and adjacent counties.
Because PFGE patterns obtained by a local health de-
partment may appear to be sporadic or unrelated to a more 
generalized process (2), local public health practitioners 
may gain a larger perspective by receiving notiﬁ  cation of 
state and national clusters (4,5). During 2002–2005, before 
this study was conducted but during a time HDHHS was 
in routine communication with PulseNet, most local PFGE 
patterns were not recognized as linked to statewide or na-
tionwide clusters.
In this study, HDHHS sought to determine more rigor-
ously the utility of PFGE in local surveillance (as opposed 
to national surveillance) in detecting area clusters and ve-
hicles of transmission. Another goal was to determine how 
local PFGE patterns and clusters are associated with larger-
scale clusters. The study was approved by the Committee 
for the Protection of Human Subjects, University of Texas 
Health Science Center.
The Study
During an 8-month period, May 1 through December 
31, 2007, HDHHS received 145 Salmonella case reports in 
which patients resided in Houston. The HDHHS laboratory 
performed PFGE for 106 (73%) isolates from the Hous-
ton case-patients. The laboratory performed PFGE for all 
isolates it received. The remaining 39 Houston cases had 
been reported by providers that did not forward the isolate 
to HDHHS. The HDHHS laboratory used a standardized 
PulseNet  Salmonella protocol for PFGE and compared 
PFGE patterns for these isolates by using Bionumerics 4.0 
software (Applied Maths, Sint-Martens-Latem, Belgium). 
Using a hypothesis-generating questionnaire, immediate-
ly upon receiving the case the ﬁ  rst author interviewed 96 
(91%) of the 106 case-patients with an assigned PFGE pat-
tern. Follow-up was not feasible for the remaining 10 case-
patients. Table 1 provides the demographic characteristics 
of the 106 case-patients. The HDHHS laboratory posted the 
PFGE patterns weekly to HDHHS epidemiologists, who 
then further investigated the clusters attempting to identify 
common sources.
Epidemiologists considered a group of Salmonella 
cases to be a cluster if 1) PFGE patterns of all isolates were 
indistinguishable; and 2) specimens were collected each 
within 90 days of at least 1 other case. A more inclusive 
90-day interval was used, rather than the 60-day interval 
used by PulseNet, because the number of cases in a local 
PFGE cluster is typically small. A case that was not in a 
cluster was considered a singlet case.
Analysis of 106 Salmonella isolates from Houston 
residents yielded 74 distinctive PFGE patterns, of which 66 
were forwarded to the Texas Department of State Health 
Services (DSHS) for comparison with the DSHS labora-
tory’s database and to further identify clusters. Eight sin-
glet patterns were not further analyzed because of lack of 
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ID numbers and county of residence for case-patients with 
matching isolate PFGE patterns, and HDHHS and DSHS 
epidemiologists conferred about the data.
Of the 106 Salmonella cases with identiﬁ  ed PFGE 
patterns, 42 assembled into 10 clusters, with 2–13 cases 
per cluster. PFGE patterns for 8 of these clusters matched 
patterns in the DSHS statewide database, and patterns of 5 
clusters matched those in other states obtained during the 
same period (Table 2).
HDHHS identiﬁ  ed a likely exposure for 3 local PFGE 
clusters (Table 2). The ﬁ  rst cluster, S. enterica serovar 
Braenderup JBPX01.0516 (PulseNet nomenclature), in-
cluded 2 Houston case-patients and 5 case-patients resid-
ing in adjoining counties. Two persons reported travel to 
Matamoros, Mexico, before getting sick. Four isolates in 
the DSHS database had this PFGE pattern, of which 3 had 
been obtained from case-patients who resided in Browns-
ville, Texas, near Matamoros. HDHHS posted the PFGE 
pattern on PulseNet Listserve, and the Ohio Department of 
DISPATCHES
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Table 1. Cases of Salmonella infection reported to HDHHS, incidence rates, and PFGE results, May 1, 2007–December 31, 2007* 
Case-patient
characteristic
No. cases reported to 
HDHHS (%), n = 145 
Incidence rate,† 
n = 145 
No. (%) case-patients 
assigned a PFGE pattern, 
n = 106 
No. (%) case-patients 
assigned a PFGE pattern 
and interviewed, n = 96 
Sex
  M  65 (44.8)  10.0 50 (47.2)  45 (46.9) 
  F  80 (55.2)  12.3 56 (52.8)  51 (53.1) 
Age, y 
  <1  27 (18.6)  119.3  21 (19.8)  19 (19.8) 
  1–4  40 (27.6)  47.3 31 (29.2)  27 (28.1) 
  5–19  21 (14.5)  7.3 11 (10.4)  11 (11.5) 
  20–34  9 (6.2)  2.6 7 (6.6)  7 (7.3) 
  35–54  20 (13.8)  5.5 15 (14.2)  13 (13.5) 
  55–74  16 (11.0)  10.4 13 (12.3)  11 (11.5) 
 > 75 12 (8.3)  25.4 8 (7.5)  8 (8.3) 
Race/ethnicity
 White 
  Non-Hispanic  37 (25.5)  9.2 27 (25.5)  25 (26.0) 
  Hispanic  70 (48.3)  14.4 45 (42.4)  43 (44.8) 
  Black  23 (15.9)  7.1 20 (18.9)  17 (17.7) 
  Asian  9 (6.2)  13.1 9 (8.5)  9 (9.4) 
  Unknown  6 (4.1)  ‡ 5 (4.7)  2 (2.1) 
Total 145 11.1 106 96
*HDHHS, Houston Department of Health and Human Services; PFGE, pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. 
†Rate was calculated as number of cases/100,000 population/year, based on the 8-month study period. 
‡Rate was not calculable. 
Table 2. Ten Salmonella pulsed-field gel electrophoresis clusters among residents of Houston, Texas, USA, and 2 Houston singlet 
cases linked by PFGE to national outbreaks, detected May 1, 2007–December 31, 2007* 
Serotype 
PFGE pattern, 
Xbal†
No. cases in 
Houston 
No. other cases in 
DSHS database 
Associated national 
outbreak 
Common exposure or 
other link 
Braenderup JBPX01.0516 2 4 PulseNet outbreak 
0708HUJBP-1c 
Traveled or resided in 
southern Texas 
Corvallis SCVX01.0014  2 0 – Unknown 
Enteritidis JEGX01.0004 13 Numerous  PulseNet outbreak 
0801PAJEG-1 
Egg consumption 
Enteritidis JEGX01.0005 6 25 – Unknown 
Infantis JFXX01.0022 3 5 – Unknown 
Infantis JFXX01.0041 5 1 – Unknown 
Paratyphi b var. java  JKXX01.0014 4 2 PulseNet outbreak 
0710NCJKX-1c (7)
Contact with miniature 
turtles
Typhimurium JPXX01.0276 2 0 – Unknown 
Typhimurium JPXX01.0621 3 3 PulseNet outbreak 
0801ORJPX-1c
Unknown 
Typhimurium JPXX01.0006 2 3 Possible  bovine  outbreak 
(multistate) 0708MLJPX-1c 
Unknown 
Typhimurium JPXX01.1037 1 0 PulseNet outbreak 
0704WIWWS-1c
Packaged vegetable 
product‡ 
Typhimurium JPXX01.1354 1 1 PulseNet outbreak 
0703MLJPX-2c 
Contact with hamsters‡ 
*PFGE, pulsed-field gel electrophoresis; DSHS, Texas Department of State Health Services.  
†PulseNet nomenclature. 
‡The case was linked by PFGE to a PulseNet cluster, but the patient denied having been exposed to the hypothesized epidemiologic link.PFGE for Salmonella infection Surveillance
Health responded with information regarding a concurrent 
outbreak of the same strain in a church group whose mem-
bers became ill while visiting southern Texas. S. enterica 
serovar Enteritidis JEGX01.0004, one of the most common 
patterns in the HDHHS and DSHS PFGE databases, was 
noted by HDHHS to be occurring at above expected lev-
els in December 2007. The Pennsylvania Department of 
Health posted outbreak clusters in Pennsylvania with the 
same strain, associated with the consumption of improperly 
cooked eggs. Nine of the 13 (69%) Houston case-patients 
reported eating eggs during the week before illness onset. 
In 2 Houston households, persons became sick after eating 
eggs purchased in farmers’ markets. The North Carolina 
Division of Public Health linked a third PFGE cluster, S. 
enterica serovar Paratyphi B var. Java, JKXX01.0014, to 
miniature turtles (7). Two of 4 Houston patients and anoth-
er patient in Victoria, Texas, reported having contact with 
miniature turtles.
During the 8-month study, the HDHHS laboratory 
also sent patterns for 56 (87%) of the 64  singlet isolates to 
DSHS, which coupled 11 (20%) of these with more cases 
in their statewide database. Isolates from 2 Houston sin-
glet cases had patterns matching 2 concurrent multistate 
outbreak patterns. An isolate of S. enterica serovar Typh-
imurium JPXX01.1037 matched a PulseNet PFGE clus-
ter pattern attributed to a nationally distributed packaged 
vegetable product. The other isolate, S. enterica serovar 
Typhimurium JPXX01.1354, matched a pattern linked to 
an outbreak investigated by Wisconsin Division of Public 
Health in which case-patients were exposed to hamsters. 
For these singlets, HDHHS was unable to conﬁ  rm an epi-
demiologic link between the Houston case and the national 
outbreak (Table 2).
Conclusions
Using PFGE patterns, HDHHS discerned vehicles of 
transmission for local clusters. Such ﬁ  ndings could enable 
a local health department to intervene to address outbreaks 
currently in progress. Even small clusters are strong indica-
tors because the actual number of cases in an outbreak is 
typically vastly larger.
Consistent cooperation between HDHHS and DSHS 
epidemiologists enabled them to see Houston PFGE pat-
terns in a context of statewide and national patterns and 
clusters. A Houston PFGE pattern that was part of a local 
cluster was quite likely to match a DSHS (statewide) or 
CDC (national) pattern. This ﬁ  nding is in contrast to results 
for 56 singlet patterns; only 11 were found to match pat-
terns of cases outside the local area.
Analysis of PFGE clustering assisted this surveillance 
system in detecting outbreaks successfully. Findings on 
PulseNet helped HDHHS epidemiologists identify sources 
of bacteria in local clusters. HDHHS conducted prompt 
interviews of 91% of the Houston patients. Of course, a 
100% follow-up would have been better, but this study 
demonstrates the successes that are possible through rou-
tine surveillance by a local health department, given its 
resources. In an ideal situation, a PulseNet-certiﬁ  ed labora-
tory performs local surveillance in sustained close coop-
eration with epidemiologists who conduct timely investiga-
tions based on laboratory ﬁ  ndings.  
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